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Abstract: The paper is written to foster understanding of the function of primary school pupils’ high 
commuting rate in Hungary’s towns and cities and its role in the process of school choice. Based on 
two studies and on data collection covering all primary school pupils in the city of Pécs, I analyzed the 
pattern, direction and success rate of pupils’ efforts to find higher quality schools than their district 
schools. The aim of the study was to unpack the “commuting games” of the primary schools. Results 
indicate that, in contrast to national trends, the commuting rate of low-status and Roma primary school 
pupils is also very high within the city. However, while most of the commuting pupils have managed 
to enrol in higher quality schools than the ones in the catchment area of their homes, the majority of 
low-status and Roma commuters appear to be attending lower quality schools than those close to their 
homes, because prestigious schools informally deter them. My findings challenge the literature which 
claims that the selection mechanisms of public education are predominantly regulated by the mutual 
choices of prestigious schools and high-status pupils. Schools and their local or central maintenence 
agents are unable to control the processes against the background of a centralized system. 
Keywords: educational segregation; selection; pupils’ commuting; spatial and educational inequalities
Introduction1:
The right-wing liberal concept of society and the reforms that it has inspired are 
often criticized for creating and introducing a quasi-market system in education (van 
Zanten 2008). The per-capita-basis allocation of school budgets and other resources 
encourages schools to consider students their most important resources. This results 
in competition with two meanings: the aim of “first order” competition is to enrol 
as many students as possible in order to maximize resources, while “second-order 
competition” is aimed at enrolling the students considered the most academically 
able so as to enhance the school’s prestige (Gewirtz et al 1995). The possibility of 
1 The author thanks Erika Csovcsics and Ágnes Gosztonyi for their generous help and Gábor Havas for his valuable comments on 
the first draft of this paper.
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school choice necessarily exacerbates inequities everywhere as it pushes schools to 
sort and select students (Musset 2012). 
Nevertheless, the quasi-market system of Britain and the USA which is based 
on free parental choice and indirect state control should be compared cautiously to 
the education liberalization that ensued the post-communist transition in countries 
such as Hungary (Kovai ‒ Neumann 2015). In the communist era, the admission 
quotas of secondary schools were predominantly determined by the annual 
decisions of the government, and influential state-owned factories continuously 
and successfully lobbied for the majority of students to attend vocational schools 
after finishing their primary education. The post-socialist liberalization of school 
choice had a significant inclusive effect because secondary admission quotas were no 
longer determined by the government. However, until the nationalization of schools 
in 2013, extensive secondary expansion had concealed growing between-school 
inequalities within public education because, due to a co-financing system, school-
maintaining municipalities had had a vested interest in maximizing the number 
of secondary school students and, as a consequence, the proportion of pupils from 
secondary grammar (gimnázium) and secondary vocational schools (szakközépiskola) 
that were enrolled steadily increased (Fehérvári et al. 2010). Furthermore, the massive 
expansion of secondary education greatly improved the chances of disadvantaged and 
Roma pupils entering into secondary education.
At the same time, the fact that social background significantly determines 
educational outcomes in Hungary clearly originates from a regulatory system based 
on unlimited free parental choice at all levels of schooling, the unregulated and 
informal competition of schools for students, primary schools’ informal admission 
practices, and a diversified school system. One of the main reason for early tracking 
is that students can apply to eight- or six-year secondary grammar schools at the ages 
of 10 and 12. In this system, one’s school performance and educational chances are 
predominantly determined by early school choices to a much greater extent than in 
most OECD countries (OECD 2015). The  weak capacity of the educational system to 
compensate for pupils’ disadvantages resulted in the fact that in 2005 nearly 20 percent 
of the year’s cohort left public education having completed no more than eight years 
of primary school, despite the compulsory school attendance age having been raised 
from 16 to 18 years in 1996 (Kertesi ‒Varga 2005). 
Given these circumstances, educational authorities cannot uphold a stable and 
inclusive education system. Depending on their perceived particular interests, schools 
and parents will undermine its stability. 
It is highly doubtful whether a targeted voucher system would be capable of 
counterbalancing the effect of private schools (Hsieh ‒ Urquiola 2006; Fiske ‒ 
Ladd 2000). Educational systems based on free school choice are often described 
as “universal” voucher schemes whereby all students are provided with a symbolic 
voucher which can be “redeemed” at any school in the country, although only district 
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schools are obliged to admit pupils without further consideration (OECD 2017). 
Accordingly, parents choose primary schools for their children based on the schools’ 
perceived quality and social composition. They can put their children’s names down 
for any school they choose to, but pupils only have to be accepted by their catchment 
area schools. Beyond that, however, it is up to the individual schools, which act within 
the limits of the places they have available, to decide whether to accept children from 
outside their area. On the other hand, schools are not only interested in maximizing 
the number of students, but also in improving or at least defending their prestige and 
local status by admitting presumably well-performing students. The mutual choices 
of middle-class parents and prestigious schools2 necessarily leads to the unequal 
distribution of educational services.
Approximately 13-14 percent of students in Hungarian primary schools are Roma 
(Papp Z. 2015). It is a crucial and open-ended question whether the mutual selection 
process is basically “colour-blind”; that is, if the ethnicity of students adds to the effect 
of the ESCS3 of Roma parents being lower than average, and if their children’s abilities 
and performance will subsequently also be below average. The literature implies that 
this is not the case; instead, the symbolic significance of ethnicity is far greater and 
non-Roma parents simply do not wish their children to attend the same schools or at 
least the same classes as Roma kids (Kemény et al. 2004; Dupcsik 2009). In the former 
case, the mutually presumed and perceived ability spectrum of schools and children 
would result in steady balance and student commuting trends would be predictable. 
This dilemma is particularly significant in Hungary, because the impact of 
parents’ ESCS on the educational performance of students is higher than in most 
OECD countries (Csapó et al. 2014; Radó 2014; Ostorics et al. 2016) and therefore, 
according to my research experience, the impact of the social background of families 
is an essential factor in the selection criteria for school principals. 
Roma pupils’ performance in reading may be explained explicitly by their social 
status, and their performance in mathematics only slightly lags behind that of non-
Roma pupils of similar socioeconomic background. On the other hand, their dropout 
rate from secondary and vocational schools is significantly higher than that of non-
Roma pupils of similar socioeconomic background, and they are less likely to continue 
their education in secondary schools than their non-Roma peers of similar abilities 
and results (Kertesi ‒ Kézdi 2010). 
High commuting rates are a characteristic feature of public education regimes 
based on free parental school choice. The high proportion of primary school students 
who opt for schools outside their catchment zone has been demonstrated in several 
previous studies4 (Havas ‒ Zolnay 2011). It has always been clear that pupil commuting 
2 I define parents as middle class if they have an opportunity to choose from the best, or allegedly best schools for their children. 
I define schools as prestigious if they have the opportunity to admit the best, presumably most academically able pupils.
3 Index of Economic Social and Cultural Status.
4 The commuting rate for primary school pupils who leave their local catchment area was 64 percent in larger Hungarian towns, 
and only 36 percent opted for their catchment zone school.
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is inherently unequal because pupils of higher status are significantly more likely to 
commute.5 Kertesi and Kézdi (2009) found a strong positive association between the 
number of schools in a vicinity and the commuting rates of middle class children,6 
but the fundamental significance of commuting was only proved by their research on 
the educational policies of 100 towns and cities in 2011. Their hypothesis was that 
in Hungarian towns and cities the ethnic segregation of primary schools is strongly 
related to the proportion of Roma pupils attending primary schools, the segregating or 
integrative nature and effect of local educational policy, and the amount of residential 
segregation. Survey results confirmed the first two hypotheses, but, astonishingly, 
found that residential segregation has NO direct impact on level of school segregation. 
There is also a significant association between the level of local educational segregation 
and the commuting rate of high-status students. This  means that the commuting rate 
is so high that it can neutralize the previously assumed impact of residential segregation on 
the level of school segregation (Kertesi ‒ Kézdi 2013). Accordingly, the selection process 
is predominantly regulated by the willingness to commute of middle-class students. 
Main research questions 
The novelty of my study is that it attempts to map and interpret the trends and 
direction of pupils’ commuting across catchment areas in a large city for the first time. 
This article is based on three comprehensive periods of data collection7 conducted in 
2007, 2009 and in 2014 in all primary schools of Pécs. Data collection concentrated 
on the presumed motivation, direction, and the success of different pupil groups 
in commuting, the commuting balance of the catchment areas of primary schools, 
and the “commuting games” of schools (Neumann ‒ Zolnay 2008; Zolnay 2010). The 
research questions of my third and second survey were designed to take forward the 
above-mentioned nationwide representative survey conducted in 2011 (Kertesi ‒ 
Kézdi 2013).
Therefore, my core research questions concerned whether the vast majority of 
commuter pupils really manage to attend higher status schools, and whether only a 
small proportion of low-status pupils commute to schools outside their catchment area. 
More generally, the study focused on whether the school selection process is regulated 
predominantly by “white flight”; that is, the mutual choice of prestigious schools and 
high-status pupils. If white flight does not exclusively regulate the commuting process, 
nor indirectly shape the selection mechanism of public education, then two relevant 
5 In urban settlements, less than 25 percent of lower-status students (whose mother’s education lasted a maximum of eight 
grades) commuted to a school other than their catchment school, while in the case of higher-status students (whose mothers 
had completed 12 grades or more) the rate was 50 percent.
6 In towns with only a few schools, fewer than 20 percent of middle-class students commuted. In towns with 10 schools, the 
proportion was over 40 percent, and 60 percent in towns with 40 schools. 
7 The first study  was conducted in the framework of EÖKiK (Public Foundation for European Comparative Minority Research), 
while its successor, CEC (Civitas Europica Centralis Foundation) (http://www.cecid.net/en/about-us), supported the second 
study. 
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additional questions must be raised. How can we characterize the commuting patterns 
of different pupil groups, and how successful are the former in their efforts to find and enrol 
in schools better than their own catchment schools? What kind of school strategies can 
be identified in terms of the balance of their commuting inflow and outflow, and what 
kind of strategies do schools use to improve their positions and enhance their real or 
perceived interests? 
I used the school’s results in the National Assessment of Basic Competences as 
an indicator of school quality. I do not suppose that the majority of parents are well 
aware of the National Competence Assessment scores of primary schools, not to 
mention their added value indexes, but I do contend that parental choice via pupil 
commuting can be approached by taking a rational choice perspective. Consequently, 
I assume that the school choice of Roma parents is similarly driven by the motivation 
of finding primary schools perceived as better quality. 
Methods 
The study included all primary public schools and all pupils attending the public 
primary schools of Pécs.8 I collected data about the number of all pupils from each 
school, grade and class, specifying disadvantaged and multiply disadvantaged pupils, 
pupils with special educational needs, pupils with learning difficulties, and pupils 
perceived as Roma by the schools. Thereafter I identified the catchment area of each 
pupil.9 This database allowed me to map the commuting patterns of school catchment 
areas for each pupil group. I could assess which schools attracted commuting pupils in 
each category and where these pupils commuted from. I ranked the primary schools 
based on the data from the national competence assessment which allowed me to 
assess the success and direction of pupil movements in each pupil category and the 
bargaining positions of the schools. 
The criteria defining the categories of disadvantaged, multiply disadvantaged 
pupils, pupils with special educational needs, and pupils with learning difficulties are 
statutory. Roma pupils are not registered officially and formally but the researchers’ 
experience is that principals are acutely aware of who is Roma; likewise, non-Roma 
parents are keenly aware of alleged ethnic proportions, irrespective of the self-
identification of pupils. Tolerated ratios vary city-to-city and even by neighbourhood. 
In assessing the proportion of Roma pupils, I used the method of expert classification. 
Besides quantitative data collection, I conducted detailed interviews with school 
principals about their schools and pupils and concerning the local educational 
bargaining in which they are involved.
8 In 2014, approximately 7800 pupils attended the 17 primary schools of the city. 
9 I collected data anonymously, and data analyses were performed on aggregated data sets.
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The priorities of the city’s educational policy 
In recent decades the city’s education policies have been driven by two consensual 
core principles. The municipality yielded to the pressure of middle-class parents who 
wished to enrol their children into the most prestigious schools of the city, and year 
after year permitted these schools to launch as many first-grade classes as possible, taking 
into account the building’s capacity. Furthermore, the municipality which operated the 
schools wanted to prevent the development of serious segregation across schools 
and periodically closed segregating schools or ghettoizing school branches. Following 
the closure of the latter schools in 2007, the scale of segregation decreased for some 
years, but after a while the proportion of Roma pupils started to grow in certain 
schools until it reached a level at which white flight occurred. Outsourcing segregated 
primary school to church maintenance in 2013 has become the third element of the city’s 
educational policy. Urban planning considerations usually do not significantly impact 
educational policy decisions due to the characteristics of the social history of cities 
(Erdősi 1968; Márfi 2005). 
Results
Segregation and commuting trends in Pécs
The city has a significant Roma population of Beash (archaic Romanian-speaking) 
and Vlach (Romani-speaking) origin. During the communist era, most Roma families 
aimed to comply with forced assimilation requirements to such an extent that they 
exclusively talked in Hungarian with their children, so their native languages have 
almost totally vanished. Among primary school pupils, the proportion of Roma is 11 
percent, which rate has been constant for a decade. The proportion of pupils with 
special educational needs was also 11 percent in 2014, of whom approximately 57 
percent studied in mainstream schools while 43 percent attended special remedial 
schools. The proportion of pupils with learning difficulties studying in mainstream 
schools was 9 percent (see Table 1).
Table 1: Different pupil groups in the primary schools in Pécs (%)
Pupils 2007 2009 2014
Disadvantaged pupils 29 23
Roma pupils 11 11 11
Multiply disadvantaged pupils 4 6 4
Pupils with special educational needs 11
Pupils with learning difficulties 9
Sources: EÖKiK and CEC data collection
Following a period of sharp increase, the extent of ethnic segregation has declined 
significantly in state schools in recent years (see Table 2 and Table 3). The commuting 
rates for primary school students slightly differed from the data measured nationwide. 
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The rate of commuting students was similar but, unexpectedly, the proportion of 
multiply disadvantaged students and Roma students attending primary school outside their 
catchment area was significantly higher than the average rate observed in large towns 
(see Table 4). However, surprisingly, the commuting rate of low-status students 
increased during the period when school segregation declined. 
Table 2: Average dissimilarity index of Roma pupils measured in each grade in 2007, 2009 
2014 in Pécs
Year Average dissimilarity index (DI) of Roma pupils measured in each grade
2007 0,04-0,05
2009 0,08-0,09
2014 0,05-0,06
Sources: EÖKiK and CEC data collection
Table 3: Distribution of Roma pupils in classes according to the proportion of Roma pupils (%)
Proportion of Roma pupils
Year 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-99%
2007 45 34 18 3
2009 42 28 20 10
2014 36 44 14 5
Sources: EÖKiK and CEC data collection
Table 4: Proportion of commuting pupils in different pupil categories in Pécs (%)
Proportion of commuting pupils
Pupils  2009  2014
Except those who attended 
special schools in 2014
All pupils 58 58 54
Disadvantaged pupils 52 53 50
Roma pupils 39 51 42
Multiply 
disadvantaged pupils
37 37 29
Pupils with special 
education needs 
n.a. 72 35
Pupils with learning 
difficulties 
n.a. 60 60
Sources: EÖKiK and CEC data collection
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School types based on the inflow and outflow rates of different pupil categories 
We identified the catchment area of commuting students and defined several school 
types on the basis of the inflow and outflow rates of different pupil categories.
We called those schools “undesirable schools” which have fewer students, fewer 
multiply disadvantaged students, and fewer Roma students than the proportion 
living in the catchment areas; in other words, the commuting balances are negative 
in the case of each student group. Apparently, all pupils, including prestigious and 
low-status students, are equally trying to escape from these schools. The illusory 
confidence of school principals that their positive relations to their neighbourhood 
might enhance their prestige is groundless; undesirable schools only manage to raise 
their student numbers when the maintainer “outsources” educational segregation by 
transferring the maintenance and the financial sources to a church, or, less commonly, 
to an NGO. Such undesirable schools should be obliged to enrol all students living in 
their catchment area even in the latter case, since in principle no one is compelled 
to attend a church-maintained school. But if there is a less prestigious (church-
maintained) school nearby, undesirable schools make every effort to “persuade” 
the highest proportion of Roma families to choose the former because they wish to 
demonstrate that they also have the potential to select children.
We call “ghetto schools” those primary schools which have fewer students overall 
than those living in their catchment area but in which multiply disadvantaged and 
Roma students are over-represented in comparison to their representation in their 
catchment area. The student commuting balance is negative in total, but in the case 
of multiply disadvantaged and Roma students, the rate is positive. In other words, 
these schools are undesirable to primary school students in general, but they are quasi 
“attractive” to low-status students who practically have no choice in the school market. 
Ghetto schools are aware that their existence depends on the inflow of multiply 
disadvantaged and Roma students from outside their catchment area. Therefore they 
cannot afford to reject anyone. 
We term “selective schools” those primary schools which overall have more students 
than those living in their catchment area, but fewer multiply disadvantaged and Roma 
students compared to the proportion expected in light of their catchment area. The 
student commuting balance is positive in total, but for multiply disadvantaged and 
Roma students the rate is negative. These schools are very attractive throughout the 
city, but nonetheless they reject many students who live in their catchment area whom 
they should be obliged to enrol without any further consideration. In practice, they 
do this by indirectly discouraging them and persuading them to choose other schools. 
A significant proportion of multiply disadvantaged and Roma students are rejected 
and displaced to less prestigious primary schools elsewhere in the city. Besides their 
quality and specialist curricula (for example, bilingual education), an important part 
of their hidden portfolio is that they can “guarantee” that middle-class children will 
not have Roma, or very poor classmates. “Selective schools” have few or no ties to the 
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neighbourhood, or may even seek to reduce their relationship with their immediate 
residential environment to a minimum. Their actual enrolment district is the whole 
city, and they can place anyone. 
We use the term “attractive schools” for those primary schools which have more 
students and more multiply disadvantaged students and also more Roma students 
than their expected numbers in light of their catchment area; here, the commuting 
balances are positive in the case of each student group. These schools are attractive to 
all pupils, including prestigious and low-status students.
Pre-selective school: Twenty years ago, two schools and five pre-schools launched a 
joint preschool-primary school programme. Connecting pre-school education groups 
and primary school classes, the same teachers (who hold dual teacher-kindergarten 
qualifications) teach children from the age of three to ten. The main purpose of this 
programme is to facilitate the transition of children  from preschool to primary 
school. However, the prestige of the two primary schools has started to diverge and it 
has become more and more important into which of the five preschools children can 
be enrolled because preschool choice determines in which school a child can continue 
their studies.
Table 5: Distribution of pupils among different types of primary schools: inflow and outflow 
rates of different pupil groups in Pécs in 2014 (%)
All 
pupils 
Disadvantaged 
pupils
Roma 
pupils 
Multiply 
disadvantaged 
pupils
Pupils with 
special 
education 
needs
Pupils with 
learning 
difficulties
Undesirable schools 18,8 21,3 31,0 45,1 20,9 22,2
Ghetto schools 6,8 10,1 18,8 14,4 6,0 8,5
Selective schools 27,3 13,5 3,0 2,2 8,2 22,0
Attractive schools 23,6 25,8 15,5 3,7 10,0 22,2
Outsourced 
segregated school 
1,0 3,7 10,5 3,9 6,8 16,1
Pre-selective school 15,6 18,7 8,0 19,1 1,8 5,8
Special school 4,7 2,6 10,1 10,2 43,3 0
Other schools 2,2 4,3 3,1 1,4 3,0 3,2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Data collection by CEC 
We divided the city’s primary schools into quintiles based on their national competence 
assessment performance. Highly selective schools are located in the highest quintile. 
The primary schools ranked into the second quintile cannot be categorized clearly, but 
in general they can be described as slightly undesirable. Attractive schools fell into the 
third school quintile; and undesirable schools fell into the fourth school quintile, while 
the lowest quintile contained the ghetto schools. 
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Table 6: Distribution of Roma pupils across school quintiles of The National Competence 
Assessment in 2014 (%)
All pupils Roma pupils
Living in 
catchment areas 
(%)
Attending schools 
(%)
Living in  catchment 
areas (%)
Attending schools 
(%)
1. (The highest) 11,6 20,2 10,1 2
2. 28,4 26,2 11,3 8,1
3 9 20,6 8 19
4. 19,9 17,1 41,3 29,8
5. (The lowest) 21,1 11,3 23,5 30,9
Pre-selective 
school
10,2 5,7
Special school 4,7 10,1
Sources: Data collection by CEC
Commuting games in the city
Each school assumes that the size, social composition and urban status of its 
catchment area decisively influences its prestige and position in the local educational 
market. Based on the finding of a survey that assessed the educational policy of 
100 cities and towns in 2011 (Kertesi ‒ Kézdi 2013), this false assumption can be 
considered the fundamental “spatial perception” of primary schools which largely 
determines their enrolment policy. Three corresponding institutional strategies can 
be identified in Pécs.
Preventive strategy: Schools situated in slum areas want to avoid a further increase 
in the proportion of Roma pupils and therefore the possible closure of even less 
prestigious schools nearby seems to be the greatest threat to them. They generally 
consider the size of their catchment zones to be irrelevant. 
The municipality attempted to close a segregated ghetto school located near the 
largest shanty town/segregated area of the city several times, but the preventive 
strategy of the neighbouring schools proved to be successful: the school principals 
worried about the consequences and successfully lobbied the municipality to prevent 
this occurring. One year before the nationalization of primary and secondary schools, 
the mayor of the city made it clear that the ghetto school was to be closed soon 
unless the school principal “found” a church or a foundation that would be willing to 
take over the maintenance of the school. The school principals approached the local 
pro-government MP to intervene on their behalf. The MP was happy to help, and 
“convinced” the Roman Catholic Church to take over the school’s maintenance despite 
its former reluctance. Segregation outsourcing became a new, previously unknown 
element of local education policy. The surrounding schools were thus able to avert the 
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“threat” that pupils of the ghetto school might “overwhelm” them, but each school’s 
status continued to deteriorate. The number of pupils declined drastically; the 
proportion of Roma and multiply disadvantaged pupils increased, and more children 
living in their vicinity seemed to prefer other primary schools. Nonetheless, these 
schools sustained their strategy.
Manoeuvring astutely in local politics, school principals of two “threatened” 
undesirable central institutions were successfully able to prevent the proposed closure 
of their small, segregated branch schools, but nevertheless they could only slow down 
the outflow of students from their catchment areas, and did not manage to stem the 
further decline of their status. Gentrification of local neighborhoods did not increase 
the school’s attractiveness either. 
A significant number of commuting multiply disadvantaged and Roma pupils 
living near undesirable schools enrolled into ghetto schools. These schools are “the 
winners“ of the “commuting game” – but only as long as they are indifferent towards 
the social and ethnic composition of their schools. The continuous decline of these 
schools’ prestige and their student population may induce a change in their strategy. 
The largest ghetto school in the city desperately tried to improve its music education 
to make itself more attractive, and also attempted to introduce a selective admission 
policy. However, they lacked the preconditions for selective recruitment and their 
student numbers further decreased. Finally, the school principal and the maintainer 
chose to invite the Roman Catholic Church to take over the school. In this case, the 
final aim was not to “outsource” segregation (the proportion of Roma pupils was 
about 23 percent and the school is far from being segregated), but rather to displace 
low-status pupils and to increase the school’s prestige. However, due to this the 
“preventive game” of the surrounding schools has restarted.
Isolation strategy: Highly prestigious schools with catchment areas that also 
comprise slum neighborhoods or disreputable streets wish to further decrease the 
already low rate of pupils living in their vicinity and to isolate themselves from their 
urban environment even more. In the case of a school closure nearby, their aim is to 
minimize the number of students they have to take in. 
The largest segregated school was situated close to the historic centre of the 
city and its catchment area was adjacent to the catchment districts of the two most 
prestigious primary schools that were also comprised of slum neighborhoods. The 
two prestigious elite schools successfully isolated themselves from their vicinity; 
nevertheless, they were anxious about the eventual closure of the segregated school. 
That fear proved to be irrational due to the extremely low proportion (10-26 percent) 
of pupils of the latter living in their vicinity. However, these schools consider each 
other as mutual rivals. 
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Pécs was the European Capital of Culture in 2010,10 and a major construction project 
started not far from the segregated school. A concert hall and a cultural centre 
were built, and the famous Zsolnay porcelain factory was converted and rebuilt as a 
cultural and educational complex. Currently, it accommodates several departments 
of the University of Pécs. However, on three sides the whole neighbourhood is 
surrounded by urban slums and even miserable Roma settlements. It was evident 
that the gentrification of the surrounding neighbourhood would start soon and 
a decision about the immediate closure of the segregated school was motivated by 
urban planning considerations. This was the only occasion when a primary school 
closure was firmly incited by urban planning goals. 
The splitting of the catchment area and the allocation of pupils who had been 
attending the segregated school was the subject of a kind of a barter deal. The two high-
prestige elite schools did not have any other choice but to acknowledge and accept 
that they had to share most of the catchment area of the former segregated primary 
school, but they were not willing to enrol and accommodate the Roma pupils of the 
area. These schools were convinced that they simply could not afford to admit Roma 
pupils at all due to their exceptional prestige and high reputation. They assumed – not 
without reason – that they would be able to refuse or avoid admitting any undesirable 
pupils living in the slum area associated with their catchment area, just as they had 
earlier. 
On the other side of the historic city centre, relatively far away from the closed, 
segregated school and situated in an old and beautiful building, there is a primary 
school that was threatened with closure due to a drastic decrease in the student 
population. This school received the pupils from the closed segregated school in the 
hope that it could thereby stabilize its position. These expectations were met only 
partially, because having been made aware of the decision, almost as many pupils left 
the school and chose to enrol elsewhere as many pupils arrived from the segregated 
school. The proportion of Roma pupils was not higher than 25 percent, but this 
proved to be more than the amount that the middle class was willing to tolerate in 
this urban environment. Moreover, the newcomers were stigmatized merely because 
they had attended the “ill-famed” segregated school. However, this game is also full 
of uncertainties. As the number of pupils continuously declines, closure of the school 
is just a matter of time. In this case, the “barter deal” might backfire: the two highly 
prestigious schools that shared the catchment area of the former segregated school 
will still be forced to admit pupils living in the slum neighbourhood.
Area-enlarging strategy: Primary schools situated in socially homogeneous 
neighborhoods, usually in the middle of large housing estates, attempt to increase 
their catchment areas when a neighbouring school is closed or when catchment area 
boundaries are being redrawn. 
10 Three cities were chosen to be the European Capitals of Culture in 2010: Essen, Pécs, and Istanbul. 
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In Pécs, housing estates are socially more homogeneous than neighborhoods 
that encompass older buildings, suburbs, former miners’ colonies, or poor Roma 
settlements. The primary school situated in the southern part of the largest of the 
giant housing estates has a specific position. Fifteen years ago, the school moved 
towards specializing in the inclusive education of pupils with special educational 
needs and learning difficulties. As a result, the number of pupils and the school’s 
prestige declined steadily. The catchment area of the school comprises a village-like 
neighbourhood where some wealthy carter Roma families11 live. Even though the 
proportion of Roma pupils is not higher than 13 percent, the school’s reputation is 
very poor and nearly 70 percent of pupils living nearby have opted to attend other 
schools in the inner part of the huge housing estate, about eight to ten bus stops 
away. Recently, the school drastically changed its enrolment policy and attempted to 
improve its image by refusing to admit pupils with special needs living outside its 
district. Other school principals in the area of the housing estate shuddered nervously 
due to the influx of pupils arriving from the former school. 
Before nationalization, the municipal maintener decided to close the smallest 
school in the giant housing estate and to split its catchment area among neighbouring 
schools. These neighbouring schools competed fiercely to add as many streets and 
blocks as possible to their district. Their area-increasing strategy was just the opposite 
of the isolation strategy of elite schools. All three large rival schools have maintained 
their positions during the last decade and the vehemence of the struggle over the 
streets is hard to understand, even when all three schools are recruitment rivals. The 
vast majority of pupils of the three schools commute and live outside their districts. 
Two of them have entered into an informal coalition and agreed to split some nearby 
streets, but in vain. Eventually, they both lost out on the “area-enlarging game.” The 
largest, most influential complex which includes not only two primary schools but 
also five kindergartens and several secondary institutions obtained the majority of 
the “disputed” area. 
However, for pupils it remains uncertain whether the decision is favourable, 
because the two primary schools belonging to the complex have a single catchment 
area, and they operate pre-selection practices. Thus, the educational trajectories of 
children are largely determined by their kindergarten choice at the age of three. 
The direction and success of pupil commutes
I measured student mobility in two different ways. First, I measured in the case of 
each commuting pupil whether they attend better or worse schools compared to 
their catchment schools by ranking the city’s primary schools based on their schools’ 
national competence assessment performance data (I took into account their average 
results in the previous three years). 
11 Transporters of coal, building material or furniture by horse cart or lorry.
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Most of the primary school pupils commute within the city and the majority of 
them attend better quality schools than their district schools. On the other hand, low-
status commuters’ efforts to find a better school than their district school is not only 
unsuccessful, but the majority of them end up attending worse quality schools than their 
respective catchment school. The failure of this commuting strategy is most striking 
in the case of Roma commuters, especially considering that 51 percent of all Roma 
pupils commute and opt for a primary school other than their catchment school. 
But even if we disregard those Roma pupils who attend the city’s special school, 42 
percent of Roma students still commute. Only 22 percent of commuting Roma pupils 
have managed to enrol in better quality schools than their district schools, 62 percent 
of them have chosen worse quality primary schools, and nearly 17 percent have been 
diagnosed as pupils with special educational needs who must not study in integrated, 
mainstream classrooms.
Table 7: The commuting direction of pupils into schools ranked by schools’ results in the 
national assessment of basic competences in 2014 (%)
Attends better  
quality school than 
district school
Attends worse 
quality school than 
district school
Attends  special 
school
Total
All pupils 52,8 40,8 6,4 100
Disadvantaged 
pupils 
45,4 51,7 2,9 100
Roma pupils 22,2 61,0 16,8 100
Multiply 
disadvantaged 
pupils 
24,0 53,0 23,0 100
Pupils with special 
education needs 
24,9 23,8 51,3 100
Pupils with learning 
difficulties 
48,0 52,0 0 100
Sources: Data collection by CEC
Second, I divided primary schools into quintiles based on their results in the national 
assessment of basic competences; this assessment is administered by the government 
annually (I took the average of the previous three years). 
According to their motivation or compulsion; direction and success, we divided 
commuter pupils into several groups. 
Pupils who successfully flee from low-status schools:
These pupils commute because they wish to attend better quality, more prestigious 
schools than their catchment school, and these families are not willing to accept 
Roma children as classmates or schoolmates. Their motivation can only be precisely 
described by the concept of “white flight.”
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Pupils who successfully retain their high status: These pupils commute because they 
prefer to attend a prestigious school, although their catchment school is equally 
prestigious. 
Unsuccessfully fleeing pupils: These pupils commute because they wish to attend a 
better, more prestigious school than their catchment school, but they ended up 
enrolling in a school whose quality is as poor as their catchment school. 
Pupils excluded from a low-status school who enrol in segregated school: These pupils 
commute because they were “persuaded” to opt for a segregated church-run school 
instead of the district school which would be obliged to enrol them without any 
consideration.
Pupils excluded from high-status schools: These pupils commute because they were 
“persuaded” to opt for a much worse quality school instead of the prestigious district 
school which would be obliged to enrol them without any consideration. The most 
surprising and  shocking finding is that families freely choose much worse quality 
schools than their catchment schools, and thereby opt for schools with significantly 
worse educational opportunities for their children. It is quite easy to exert pressure by 
indirect means on poor and ethnically stigmatized families with low self-esteem who 
cannot assert themselves sufficiently, and to “convince” and “persuade” them to make 
extremely disadvantageous decisions on behalf of their children. 
Table 8: The commuting direction of pupils according to school quintiles in 2014 (%)
  All pupils
Disadvantaged 
pupils
Roma 
pupils
Multiply 
disadvantaged 
pupils
Pupils with 
special 
educational 
needs
Pupils with 
learning 
difficulties
Successfully 
fleeing from 
low-status 
schools
41.4 30 13.8 13 13 34.3
Successfully 
retaining high 
status
14.1 12.6 4.9 4 4.5 12.2
Unsuccessfully 
fleeing from 
low-status 
schools 
4.7 3.4 7.4 18 3.1 4.2
Excluded from 
prestigious 
schools 
22.3 24.4 40.5 27 19.4 34.1
Attending 
special school
6.4 3.9 17.7 23 51.3 0
Sources: Data collection by CEC
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Conclusion
The majority of commuter pupils in Pécs end up in higher status, better quality 
schools. However, my findings did not confirm the nationwide urban trends that 
just a small proportion of low-status pupils commute (Kertesi ‒ Kézdi 2013). In the 
examined city it is not true that the selection process is dominantly influenced by the 
“white flight” phenomenon, or in other words, by the mutual choices of prestigious 
schools and high-status pupils. In addition, the displacement of poor and Roma pupils 
from prestigious schools is an equally important factor in urban segregation. 
In an urban environment, the higher the prestige of the school, the greater the 
geographical scope from where it can recruit pupils. This is exactly the opposite of the 
findings in the British literature which describe how the most popular schools have 
the smallest catchment areas (Hamnet and Butler 2010). The more selective a school 
is, the more it displaces the unwanted, the poor, and above all, Roma children. But 
while the undesirable schools try to maintain ties with their catchment area and hope 
that the gentrification of neighborhoods will increase their prestige, selective schools 
attempt to diminish all ties to their surrounding environment. 
Not only do the school maintainers and the recently created central educational 
authorities have limited opportunities to keep the process under control, but 
school strategies are also uncertain. Even if it is assumed that school principals are 
accurately aware of the commuting balance of their own school and other schools’ 
catchment areas for each pupil group, their different perceptions of residential 
environments hinder the stabilization of pupils’ distribution among schools. In this 
respect, “bounded rationality” means that the unpredictability of pupil recruitment 
compels primary schools to do everything at all cost to attract more pupils who will 
presumably enhance their reputation, and to refuse those who might spoil it. The 
extreme selectivity of Hungarian public education is a self-perpetuating process not 
only in terms of parental choice, but also in terms of school enrolment policies. 
Large-scale educational commuting fragments the urban space: boundaries cannot 
be drawn on a map because they are variable in the case of each school and each pupil. 
Any educational policy which uses regional targeting is bound to fail. The education 
map of the city is thus “illegible.”
János Zolnay: Commuting to segregation 149
References: 
Ball, S. ‒ Bowe, R. S ‒ Gewirtz, S (1995): Markets, choice and equity in education. 
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Berényi, E. (2016): Az autonómiától a szelekcióig. Az iskolaválasztás jelentése a 
rendszerváltás utáni időszak magyar közoktatásában. Budapest: Gondolat. 
Csapó, B. ‒ Fejes, J. B. ‒ Kinyó, L.‒ Tóth, E. (2014): Az iskolai teljesítmények 
alakulása Magyarországon nemzetközi összehasonlításban. In Kolosi, T., 
Tóth, I. Gy. (szerk.) Társadalmi Riport. Budapest: Tárki, 110-136. http://old.
tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/b327.pdf
Dupcsik, Cs. (2009): A magyarországi cigányság története. Történelem a cigányku-
tatások tükrében 1890-2008. Budapest: Osiris. 
Erdősi, F. (1968): A pécsi városszerkezet fejlődése és a városrészek funkcióinak al-
akulása a kapitalizmus korában. Pécs: MTA Dunántúli Tudományos Intézet 
(Közlemények 6.)
Fehérvári, A. (2015): Lemorzsolódás és a korai iskolaelhagyás trendjei. 
Neveléstudomány 3 (3): 31-47. http://nevelestudomany.elte.hu/down-
loads/2015/nevelestudomany_2015_3_31-47.pdf 
Fehérvári, A. ‒ Imre, A. ‒ Tomasz, G. (2010): Az oktatási rendszer és a tanulói 
továbbhaladás In Balázs, É. ‒ Kocsis, M. ‒ Vágó, I. (szerk.): Jelentés a Magyar 
közoktatásról. Budapest: Oktatáskutató és Fejlesztő Intézet 133-196. http://
mek.oszk.hu/12800/12893/12893.pdf 
Fiske, E. B. ‒ Ladd, H. F. (2000): When schools compete. A cautionary tale. Wash-
ington DC: Brookings Institution Press 
Hamnet, Ch. ‒ Butler, T. (2010): ‘Geography matters’: the role distance plays 
in reproducing educational inequality in East London. Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 36 (4): 479-500. 
Havas, G. ‒ Zolnay, J. (2011): Sziszifusz számvetése. Az integrációs okta-
táspolitika. Beszélő 16: (6): 24-49. http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/sziszifusz-
szamvetese 
Hsieh, Ch. T. ‒ Urquiola. M. (2006): The effects of generalized school choice 
on achievement and stratification: Evidence from Chile’s voucher program. 
Journal of Public Economics 90 (8-9): 1477-1503. 
Kemény, I. ‒ Janky, B. ‒ Lengyel, G. (2004): A magyarországi cigányság 1971-
2003. Budapest: Gondolat ‒ MTA Etnikai és Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató In-
tézet. 
Kertesi, G. ‒ Kézdi, G. (2009): Általános iskolai szegregáció Magyarországon az 
ezredforduló után. Budapest: MTA Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet. (Buda-
pesti Munkagazdaságtani Füzetek, BWP 2009/6) http://econ.core.hu/file/
download/bwp/BWP0906.pdf 
Kertesi, G. ‒ Kézdi, G. (2010): Iskolázatlan szülők gyermekei és roma fiata-
lok a középiskolában. Beszámoló az Educatio Életpálya-felmérésének 2006 
Szociológiai Szemle, 2018/4150
és 2009 közötti hullámáról. In Kolosi, T. ‒ Tóth, I. Gy. (szerk.): Társadalmi 
Riport. Budapest: Tárki 371-406. http://www.tarsadalomkutatas.hu/kkk.
php?TPUBL-A-926/publikaciok/tpubl_a_926.pdf
Kertesi, G. ‒ Kézdi, G. (2013): School segregation, school choice and educational 
policies in 100 Hungarian towns Budapest: Roma Educational Fund. http://
www.romaeducationfund.hu/sites/default/files/publications/school_segre-
gationschool_choice_and_educational_policies_-_final_2013.pdf 
Kertesi, G. ‒ Varga, J. (2005): Foglalkoztatás és iskolázottság Magyarországon. 
Közgazdasági szemle 52 (7-8): 633-662. http://www.econ.core.hu/doc/bwp/
bwp/Bwp0501.pdf
Kovai, M. ‒ Neumann, E. (2015): Hová lett az egyenlősítő közoktatás? A kom-
prehenzív iskolareform sorsa Angliában és Magyarországon 1945-től a nyol-
cvanas évekig. Educatio 24 (4): 65-78. 
Márfi, A. (2005): A pécsi cigánykolóniák a tanácskorszakban 1950-1990. Pécsi 
Szemle 8 (2): 86-101. 
Mártonfi, Gy. (2014): Korai iskolaelhagyás – hullámzó trendek. Educatio 23 (1): 
36-49.   http://www.hier.iif.hu/hu/educatio_reszletes.php?id=99 
Musset, P. (2012): School Choice and Equity: Current Policies in OECD Coun-
tries and a Literature Review. OECD Education Working Papers, No. 66. Paris: 
OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi. org/10.1787/5k9fq23507vc-en
Neumann, E. ‒ Zolnay, J. (2008): Esélyegyenlőség, szegregáció és oktatáspolitikai 
stratégiák Kaposváron, Pécsen és Mohácson. Budapest: Európai Összehason-
lító Kisebbségkutatások Közalapítvány. (Műhelytanulmány 38.) https://
www.scribd.com/doc/46660526/Eselyegyenloseg-szegregacio-es-oktata-
spolitikai-strategiak-Kaposvaron-Pecsen-es-Mohacson
OECD (2015): Education policy outlook Hungary http://www.oecd.org/educa-
tion/Hungary-Profile.pdf
OECD (2017): School choice and school vouchers: An OECD perspective. 
http://www.oecd.org/education/School-choice-and-school-vouchers-an-
OECD-perspective.pdf
Ostorics, L. ‒ Szalay, B. ‒ Szepesi. I. ‒ Vadász, Cs. (2016): PISA 2015. Össze-
foglaló jelentés. Budapest: Oktatási Hivatal.  https://www.oktatas.hu/
pub_bin/dload/kozoktatas/nemzetkozi_meresek/pisa/PISA2015_osszefo-
glalo_jelentes.pdf
Papp, Z. A. (2015): Iskolai eredményesség és a roma tanulói arány összefüg-
gésrendszere az OKM adatok alapján https://kisebbsegkutato.tk.mta.hu/
uploads/files/pappz_ea.pdf 
Radó, P. (2014): A Nemzeti Együttműködés Közoktatási Rendszere és a PISA 
mérések. http://beszelo.c3.hu/onlinecikk/a-nemzeti-egyuttmukodes-kozo-
ktatasi-rendszere-es-a-pisa-meresek
János Zolnay: Commuting to segregation 151
van Zanten, A. (2008): Competitive arenas and schools’ logics of action: a Eu-
ropean comparison. Compare 39 (1): 85-98. 
Zolnay, J. (2010) „Olvashatatlan város”. Közoktatási migráció és mi-
grációs iskolatípusok Pécsen. Esély 21 (6): 41-65. http://www.esely.org/
kiadvanyok/2010_6/04zolnay.indd.pdf
